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The G20 Compact with Africa:  
An Incomplete Initiative
GIGA Focus | Africa | Number 2 | June 2017 | ISSN 1862-3603
A key element of the G20’s partnership with Africa is the Compact with 
Africa (CWA) initiative, the primary aim of which is to support private and 
infrastructure investment. Draft compacts of five African countries – Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia – may be presented at the 
G20 Africa Partnership Conference in Berlin.
 • The CWA initiative cannot and should not be seen as a quick fix vis-à-vis the 
root causes of flight and migration. It might support development in Africa, 
but alone it will not be decisive. The initiative addresses a key mechanism of 
economic (under)development, but the coordination problem that explains 
Africa’s low income levels extends well beyond the realm of investment and 
infrastructure. An investment plan that fails to recognise this is bound to fail.
 • The CWA omits four very important issues. First, it ignores investment in edu-
cation, which is an essential complement to physical infrastructure and private 
investment. Second, it fails to discuss the G20’s responsibility in creating an 
uncertain trade and investment policy environment that harms investment in 
Africa. Third, while the compact has much to say on investor risk, it does not 
address the social and environmental risks associated with private investment. 
Fourth, the CWA fails to take seriously a comprehensive sustainable develop-
ment agenda, as implied by the 2030 Agenda.
 • The CWA does better in a technical sense and proposes a number of instruments 
that aim to achieve a better-matched supply of capital and to facilitate better 
preparation of investment projects. However, the priority seems to be de-risking 
through subsidies, which may waste resources or induce excessive risk-taking. 
Other instruments and domestic financial markets may be better at leveraging 
private investment for small, highly profitable, and highly risky African projects.
Policy Implications
Support to Africa can only succeed as a long-term endeavour. The CWA initiative 
needs to be more comprehensive; this can be achieved by linking it to country de-
velopment strategies based on the 2030 Agenda. Investment in education should 
be an integral part of the compacts. The G20 should commit to a predictable 
trade regime for Africa. Investors, multilateral development banks, and host 
countries need to address potentially adverse ecological and socio-economic ef-
fects of private investment by adhering to adequate international standards and 
by effectively implementing safeguards.
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The Proposed G20 Compact with Africa Initiative
The G20 Compact with Africa (CWA) initiative, under the G20 Finance Track, aims to 
support private investment flows and the provision of infrastructure in Africa (AfDB, 
IMF, and WBG 2017). At the core of the initiative proposed by the German presi-
dency are country-specific investment compacts prepared by African governments, 
international organisations, and bilateral partners with the main objective of encour-
aging private-sector investment. The finance ministers of five African countries (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia) attended the G20 finance minis-
ters’ meeting in Baden-Baden to signal their willingness to work on such compacts.
These compacts are meant to mobilise governments and international part-
ners to implement concrete measures to boost investment in Africa. According to 
a report that the AfDB, IMF, and WBG (2017) presented at the above-mentioned 
finance ministers’ meeting (also referred to below as the Baden-Baden document), 
the CWA initiative has three building blocks: (i) the macroeconomic framework, 
(ii) the business framework, and (iii) the financing framework. The macroeco-
nomic framework stresses resilient macroeconomic policies with a focus on debt 
sustainability, investor-friendly domestic revenue mobilisation, and sound public 
investment management. The business framework highlights the reduction of risk 
through more reliable institutions and regulation, investor protection, insurance 
against political risk, better project preparation and standardised contracts. The fi-
nancing framework emphasises reducing the costs and risks of providing financing, 
particularly through efficient risk-mitigation instruments and domestic improve-
ments in the areas of debt and institutional investor finance. Further, restrictions 
on international investments in Africa, particular those on institutional investors, 
ought to be loosened.
I argue below that the CWA initiative cannot and should not be seen as a quick 
fix vis-à-vis the causes of flight and migration and underdevelopment. In order to 
succeed, the initiative requires stamina and must be made more comprehensive. 
I outline a number of important omissions of the CWA that need to be addressed. 
Further, the instruments currently proposed in the Baden-Baden document may 
not be sufficient to effectively increase investment. I conclude with some recom-
mendations that would help to turn the initiative into a compact for sustainable 
investment in Africa.
An Aid-Based Investment Compact Alone  
Cannot Fix the Problem
It is important to understand that the main reason why Africa is receiving so much 
attention from the G20 under the German presidency is the current political con-
text in Europe, with immigration at the centre of the political discourse. Combating 
causes of flight and migration has become the elephant in the room in discussions 
about economic development in Africa. Politicians have explicitly linked migration 
and the CWA (see, for example, BMF 2016). Overall, I was happy to hear at the 
occasion of the opening ceremony of the German G20 presidency in Berlin in De-
cember 2016 the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, talking at length 
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about African development. In his speech at the G20 opening ceremony in Berlin, 
however, Mr. Schäuble referred to the initiative as a “Compact for Africa” – a state-
ment that was corrected in later communication by the ministry. I do not want to 
overstress the linguistic nuances, but this detail is exemplary of a mindset that is 
dominated by the view that “we” can fix the problem through better-coordinated 
and investment-focused aid.
The challenge to be addressed requires firm long-term commitment going way 
beyond political cycles and way beyond aid and a narrow investment compact. The 
transformative change that will have to occur in many parts of Africa to close the vast 
income gaps between Africa and Europe will run over a course of decades. To illus-
trate the order of magnitude of the income differences: Closing average income gaps 
between a poor West African country with a per capita income of USD 600 per year 
today and European levels (of USD 30,000–40,000 per year) will require annual per 
capita income growth rates close to 10 per cent continuously for the next 40 years (as-
suming that European incomes do not grow much further). This is not to say that an 
equalisation of per capita incomes can or should be a meaningful medium-term goal. 
Yet, change and transformation – at a pace unprecedented in Africa – is required to 
address the massive social challenges of most of the contin ent’s countries, including 
particularly the creation of millions of decent jobs in higher-productivity activities.
While aid and cooperation, such as the CWA, can bolster this transformation, it 
alone will not be decisive. This holds even if aid is better coordinated and thus more 
effective, and even if it is successful in mobilising private initiatives. As the report 
by the AfDB, IMF, and WBG (2017) correctly acknowledged (and documented im-
pressively in a large appendix), there has not been a dearth of initiatives towards 
Africa by international organisations and donors. However, even combined, these 
initiatives have not had the transformative effect that was hoped for. But will the 
CWA initiative be able to change that? 
A key assumption of the CWA approach is that the lack of public and, more so, 
private investment is rooted in a coordination problem. This idea has been advocated 
by, among others, Paul Collier, a professor at Oxford University and a prominent 
voice in development policy, who is explicitly mentioned in the Baden-Baden report. 
Collier (e.g., in Collier 2013) has argued that small markets in small, poor, isolated 
economies typically prevent scale economies and hamper competition. This, together 
with high transport costs caused by poor infrastructure, makes essential inputs pro-
hibitively costly. To overcome this coordination problem, pioneering investment is 
needed, which cannot occur without public intervention in terms of improving infra-
structure, subsidising investment, providing political risk insurance, and fostering 
long-term public–private partnerships. This pioneering investment – triggered by 
the support of a country-level compact and with foreign support – can then set in 
motion a virtuous circle of further investment, so the argument goes.
This stylised notion of virtuous investment circles does highlight a key mechan-
ism of economic (under)development, which means that the CWA initiative has the 
right focus. However, the coordination problem that explains Africa’s low income 
levels extends well beyond the realm of investment and infrastructure – it includes 
other key dimensions of economic development that directly matter for investment 
and growth. These include the role and functioning of the state, the mobilisation 
of both public and private domestic resources, and the modalities of both integrat-
ing into the world economy and education. Coordination is complicated by the fact 
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that all of these spheres – notably the economic, political, and social – are closely 
intertwined, and well-functioning institutions are required to coordinate them. In 
fact, this is why economic development is, in essence, a coordination problem. For 
example, a malfunctioning state does not provide public goods, such as schools and 
roads, in sufficient quantity and quality. Consequently, its citizens are not willing to 
pay taxes, which implies that the state does not have enough resources and that polit-
icians are not held accountable – perpetuating a dysfunctional state. Such a state is 
then not in the position to provide an adequate environment for private investment.
This may sound abstract, but an investment initiative that does not acknow-
ledge these interlinkages is bound to fail. The CWA initiative, at least the AfDB–
IMF–WBG framework paper that is available today, considers only a subset of 
important interlinkages. In terms of state capacity, it emphasises sound public 
management and the need for improved performance on the part of public utilities. 
In addition, it comprises a detailed section on domestic revenue mobilisation and 
recommends tax reform to increase tax intake. Further, the CWA framework docu-
ment highlights the importance of improving the business climate through better 
and more reliable regulations and institutions, and contains a long section on invest-
or protection and dispute resolution. Despite its detail in these regards, the CWA 
initiative remains partial and incomplete in other key matters.
Why (and Where) the Compact Initiative Is Incomplete
Assuming that policy makers do not see (and do not sell) the CWA as a panacea for 
Africa’s problems, the CWA can potentially add value to international efforts by bet-
ter coordinating existing programmes at the country level. Its focus on investment 
is appropriate, and so is its emphasis on state capacity as a potentially important 
component of country-specific compacts. 
Yet, the compacts can be successful in mobilising investment for development 
only if they relate meaningfully to more comprehensive development agendas, most 
notably the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Failure to do so would de-
prive the compacts of a shared normative basis. Without losing focus, it is possible 
and necessary for an investment compact to acknowledge and build in, for example, 
the interlinkages between investment and education. Thus, in my view, four very 
important issue areas have been omitted in the Baden-Baden document. The first is 
the quality of education, the second is issues related to the integration of Africa into 
the world economy. Third, the report does not at all mention the risks associated 
with private investment – not the risks for investors, stressed heavily in the CWA, 
but for the African countries where investment takes place and for their residents. 
Fourth, in relation to all three previous points, the CWA is too narrow and fails 
to demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of development as defined by the 
2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
In my view, the lack of quality education in large parts of Africa, with many 
children finishing school being hardly able to read and write, seriously threatens 
any sustained economic progress. In its few references to education, the document 
also reduces the role of the state to providing for “basic education.” Africa will need 
en gin eers to build and run quality infrastructure. Any hope of technological leap-
frogging and harnessing the potential of new technologies rests on the capacity to 
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adopt them. Africa urgently needs better schools and universities, and an investment 
compact must not overlook this crucial topic. There have been considerable achieve-
ments in school enrolment; today approximately 80 per cent of African children go to 
primary school, up from only 60 per cent in 2000 (primary net enrolment, UN 2015). 
However, the skills acquired in schools are all too often deficient. A recent study on 
learning achievement in West Africa showed that more than two-thirds of children 
who have completed primary school lack sufficient competency in mathematics and 
reading. The results are even worse for the poorest children (Kattan 2017).
While education falls largely into African countries’ potential policy commit-
ments, quite a few potential partner countries’ commitments come to my mind in 
the context of the international trade and investment regime. We should not forget 
that the compacts are being discussed in the G20 context, currently probably the 
most powerful forum to discuss these issues. There may be political reasons for 
this omission, but you cannot have a plan for leveraging foreign private capital for 
investment in Africa without even mentioning trade and investment rules. Afri-
can economies face an uncertain trade policy environment beyond their control at 
multiple levels, whether at the multilateral level or vis-à-vis individual G20 mem-
ber states or the European Union. This harms trade and investment flows, and the 
uncertainty generates considerable risks for both investment in Africa and trade 
relations with African countries. It can be particularly harmful to a given coun-
try’s integration into global value chains, seen by some as a potential key driver of 
growth (Kappel 2016). Compact partner countries should commit to a predictable 
trade regime for the African compact economies (and others as well). Preferential 
treatment in line with the investment compact priorities could potentially be part 
of such commitments. Moreover, the compacts could be a vehicle to improve coord-
ination of bilateral and regional trade negotiations. 
Furthermore, while international investment guidelines matter for the CWA, 
they are nowhere to be found in it, possibly due to an assumption that the current 
regime – that is, the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policy Making 
(G20 Trade Ministers 2016) – provides an adequate and sufficient framework. How-
ever, the G20 principles exhibit a number of deficiencies. In particular, they place 
the burden of ensuring private investors’ observance of best practices and respect 
for human rights on host governments (G20 principle No. VIII). Here, particu larly 
in light of most African countries’ limited capacity to ensure such observance, a 
more balanced approach towards investor and host country obligations would be 
desirable. The UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Develop-
ment (UNCTAD 2015) provides such an approach. This framework would also be 
aligned with the CWA initiative’s intention of country ownership, as it explicitly 
states that the openness of investment policy should be in line with each country’s 
growth or development strategy.
Improved guidelines may curb the potential risks of private investment, but 
this will not be sufficient. The CWA places great emphasis on investor protection, 
a measure that aims to reduce investment risk. However, far too little attention is 
being paid to the social and environmental risks of investments. In particular, in 
the energy and agricultural sectors (and possibly even the mining sector) there is 
substantial scope for leveraging private capital. However, unleashing private cap-
ital in the context of weak governance bears great risks. The massive expansion of 
commercial agriculture at the expense of tropical rainforests in South America and 
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Southeast Asia is possibly the most striking evidence of this; such mistakes should 
not be repeated in Africa. However, the GIGA’s research on large-scale commercial 
agricultural expansion in Africa demonstrates the ambiguities of increased private 
investment in this sector (see, for example, Nolte et al. 2016). While more invest-
ment in agriculture is urgently needed to close the yield gaps in African agriculture, 
there are considerable risks for local populations, particularly in terms of their ac-
cess to land and water. 
Therefore, potentially adverse ecological and socio-economic effects should 
be curbed by using instruments that make investment guarantees (or similar risk-
reducing instruments) conditional upon compliance with international standards. 
Here, a detailed look at the safeguards that apply to the different facilities of the 
multilateral development banks will be required. As noted above, the G20 Guiding 
Principles are insufficient because they place excessive emphasis on host country 
obligations. This argument holds even more strongly for the weak governance envi-
ronments that prevail in many African countries. Therefore, infrastructure invest-
ments in these areas require complementary actions. 
The above three omissions of key issues from the CWA can be traced back to a 
more fundamental failure of the initiative: the almost complete lack of references 
to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – it appears in the document only 
once. “Sustainable” makes it into the document much more often, but in the context 
of public debt management. Some may say the omission is justified because the 
compact countries will decide on their priorities themselves. Yet, it should not go 
unremarked upon that all countries including the relevant African countries and 
the G20 member states have agreed to the 2030 Agenda. There are very good rea-
sons not to equate growth with development; the merits of an integrated and uni-
versal development agenda have been presented elsewhere (recently, with reference 
to the G20, for example, Dongxiao et al. 2017). 
What to Do about Too Much Money  
Chasing Too Few Projects
Addressing the above omissions will render investment plans more effective and fa-
cilitate a closer alignment of the CWA initiative with the 2030 Agenda. Additionally, 
it is worthwhile to reflect more about whether the initiative proposes the ad equate 
instruments for achieving its main objective – namely, to increase infrastructure 
and private investment. An important sentence in the Baden-Baden document 
states that there is already “too much money chasing too few projects.” So, is there 
a need to mobilise additional capital? Certainly not, but for more available capital to 
lead to more investment, action must focus on matching the return-seeking liquid-
ity in global financial markets with (a) the high-risk and long-term infrastructure 
programmes and (b) the many small, very profitable but often highly risky private-
sector projects in Africa. Instruments that improve matching will have to address 
both the supply side of capital (that is, investment and lending instruments) and the 
demand side (that is, well-prepared big and small investment projects). 
Kappel, Pfeiffer, and Reisen (2017) have recently argued that in order to fill 
Africa’s annual infrastructure funding gap of USD 50 billion, only 1 per cent of new 
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institutional investment by pension funds, life insurance companies, and sovereign 
wealth funds would be required. Yet, despite G8 and G20 efforts, private institu-
tional investment remains negligible in financing Africa’s infrastructure. Here, 
more needs to be done in terms of regulatory supply-side barriers, and the Baden-
Baden document rightly points policymakers in this direction. 
In many discussions surrounding the German G20 presidency, I came across 
the private sector’s concern about a lack of bankable projects in Africa (a bankable 
project or proposal is one that has sufficient collateral, future cash flow, and a high 
probability of success, and is acceptable to institutional lenders; from WebFinance 
2017). This is also acknowledged in the CWA initiative, and rightly so. Efforts di-
rected towards project preparation need to be stepped up, including measures to 
standardise both contracts and the modalities of public–private partnerships. How-
ever, the above-mentioned risks of investments to people and the environment will 
have to be considered in this process.
Even with improved project preparation, many projects will remain risky, which 
is why the CWA initiative stresses de-risking devices, particularly credit guarantees 
or blending private with concessional loans, to leverage private investment. This 
obviously entails the risk of subsidising projects that would have been carried out 
even without the subsidy and creates the risk of moral hazards – that is, investors 
may be induced to take excessive risks and undertake projects that they would have 
been better off not undertaking. We should also note that many of the fundamental 
risks in Africa, particularly the political ones, will not disappear within a decade 
or two. This is not to say that de-risking cannot be part of the array of instruments 
used by the investment compacts; however, it means that the success of such instru-
ments will have to be monitored very closely. 
Instead of de-risking through credit subsidies of various types, other instru-
ments for leveraging private investment may be more effective. In a short paragraph, 
the Baden-Baden document mentions credit tranching and the bundling of projects 
as potentially useful credit enhancement techniques. In particular, the bundling of 
smaller projects holds great promise for many African economies, as many projects 
may turn out not to be bankable because they are too small (and highly risky). Pro-
jects tend to be small because firms are often small. Further, some potentially impor-
tant investment sectors, decentralised renewable energy and agriculture, are charac-
terised by relatively small project sizes. In this context, emerging financing models, 
such as crowdfunding, should be closely monitored and potentially supported. In 
addition, domestic financial markets and banks should play a key role in channelling 
(increased) domestic savings and international capital into smaller-scale investment 
projects. Eventually, the right portfolio of instruments to increase infrastructure and 
private investment will of course depend on the respective compact country. 
The Compact Initiative: Not Wrong, but Incomplete
In sum, I very much welcome the initiative of the German G20 presidency to put Af-
rica prominently on the G20’s map. The focus on investment as an important elem-
ent of a renewed and enhanced partnership with Africa is also right, and the CWA 
initiative can make a difference by better coordinating international and domestic 
efforts to increase investment in Africa. The initiative mentions a number of the 
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key constraints to private and public investment in Africa and, through its country-
level approach, should also be able to take into account the specific challenges of 
individual countries. It remains unclear how the compacts will be able to address 
infrastructure needs that extend beyond one country’s borders. Most importantly, 
however, the compact initiative needs to be designed as a long-term endeavour. This 
is required in light of the order of magnitude of the challenge and the time horizon of 
most infrastructure projects. This implies that an explicit political effort will be need-
ed to keep African issues on the changing agenda of the G20 in the years to come.
The CWA has yet to be put into practice, and the present assessment relies 
solely on a framework document. This is positive in the sense that there is still time 
to address its shortcomings in the actual country-specific compacts. These com-
pacts should have clear mechanisms of review that allow for adjustments or for an 
abandonment of the approach altogether if it does not turn out to work.
The neglect of education, the G20’s responsibility to provide for a reliable inter-
national trade and investment regime, and the social and environmental risks of 
private investment all need to be addressed. This can be achieved by more closely 
linking the CWA to country development strategies that take the 2030 Agenda ser-
iously. This would leverage the potential synergies between growth, employment, 
education, poverty reduction, and environmental protection. An investment plan 
is incomplete if it does not pay attention to education. Further, the G20 should 
commit to a predictable trade regime for the African compact economies and pro-
vide preferential treatment in line with the investment compact priorities. Here, 
the European Union needs to make its contribution in the context of its Economic 
Partnership Agreements (see Giesbert et al. 2016). Potentially adverse ecological 
and socio-economic effects of private investment should be addressed by adhering 
to adequate international standards and by effectively implementing safeguards if 
multilateral lending is involved. 
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